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and appearance, reflects his adoption of Hegel’s dialecti-
cal logic.
fetishism of the commodity
The product of labor in this context has a dual nature. It
is an individual object of some kind that can be described
in its own terms: an automobile or a software program
embodying the current state of technology and specific
skills of the workers who produced it. At the same time it
has an economic value that cannot be explained by its
material qualities and that enables it to be equated some-
how with a qualitatively different object:
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing,
simply because in it the social character of men’s
labour appears to them as an objective character
stamped upon the product of that labour;
because the relation of the producers to the sum
total of their own labour is presented to them as
a social relation, existing not between them-
selves, but between the products of their labour.
(Marx 1996a, pp. 35:82–83)
Materialists and idealists battle interminably over the
explanation of this and other mysteries of philosophy
because they preserve the standpoint of the independent,
separate individual that gives rise to them. Behind the
mystery of economic value is the social nature of human
labor, the fact that each product embodies a certain pro-
portion of the combined labor of society. Because the
people whose interdependent labor is responsible for the
product have organized themselves as separate, discon-
nected individuals, their underlying social connection
takes the form of a mysterious, nonmaterial property of
their products. In the value form of the commodity spirit
and matter confront one another as irreducible opposites:
for the “value-relation between the products of labour …
[has] absolutely no connection with their physical prop-
erties and with the material relations arising therefrom”
(Marx 1996a, p. 5:83). Consequently, “[t]here it is a defi-
nite social relation between men, that assumes, in their
eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (83).
This complex relationship produces the “fetishism”
(Marx 1996a, p. 5:83) of the products of labor when they
become commodities. The combined power of human
beings appears before them as an external power ruling
over them—the market and the quasi-omnipotent power
of money. The mystery of the nonmaterial characteristics
of the product can ultimately be explained in one of two
ways: (1) As the expression of the social relations between
the producers, seen in essentially cooperative activities
that belie the capitalist form of private ownership. This is
the kind of social-historical and dialectical “materialism”
that Marx espouses. (2) Or it can be approached by refer-
ence to “the mist-enveloped regions of the religious
world,” in which “the productions of the human brain
appear as independent beings endowed with life, and
entering into relation both with one another and the
human race” (83). Marx thought that Hegel’s idealism,
for all its advances over previous materialism, did not
escape this religious, other-worldly, appearance of alien-
ated human activity.
See also Communism; Marx, Karl.
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dialectic in islamic
and jewish philosophy
In these closely related traditions dialectic is primarily
associated with the science of kalam, commonly trans-
lated as “theology,” but literally meaning “word,”“speech,”
or “discussion.” Kalam began in the eighth century as an
intellectual defense of Islam against external critics and
quickly developed into an internal debate over doctrinal
issues concerning the legitimacy of political authority, the
necessary conditions of religious belief, predestination
and free will, the ontological status of the Qur$ân, and the
relation of God’s attributes to His essential Unity. Kalam
was subsequently appropriated by Arabic-speaking Jews
living in the Islamic realm, who shared some of its con-
cerns and employed its distinctive techniques and formu-
las in the defense and systematic explanation of their own
faith.
Kalam in general is marked by its dual reliance 
on revelation and reason. The kalam theologians, or
mutakallimun, took scripture as their primary data but
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employed rational argumentation to produce the most
robust and coherent interpretations thereof. This distin-
guished them on the one hand from traditionalists and
literalists who saw logical disputation and interpretation
as leading to heresy, and on the other hand from the
Greek-influenced Islamicate philosophers, or falasifa,
who were more fully committed to the demands of rea-
son and thus wary of their theological brethren’s residual
dogmatism. Kalam’s method of reasoning and argumen-
tation was dialectical in at least two respects. The first
recalls the Aristotelian concept of dialectic, insofar as the
mutakallimun based their arguments on merely probable
or generally accepted beliefs—specifically, the revealed
truths of Islam or Judaism—rather than rationally self-
evident first principles or premises that necessitated 
consent. The falasifa, who appropriated Aristotle’s hierar-
chical distinction between dialectic and demonstration,
considered this approach insufficiently rigorous. While
their own adoption of the demonstrative syllogism held
out the prospect of certitude, they saw the mutakallimun
as hobbled by the questionable epistemic status of their
faith-based premises. However, the falasifa did not reject
dialectic altogether. They generally recognized its value as
a propaedeutic for honing intellectual skills, as well as a
tool for communicating crucial truths to those
unequipped for philosophical discourse. The
mutakallimun, for their part, remained dubious about the
philosophers’ claims to apodictic certainty.
The second sense in which kalam was dialectical
recalls certain aspects of the Socratic method. First, it was
dialogical: It typically took a question and answer form,
in effect presupposing the existence of an intellectual
adversary to drive the discourse forward. Its method was
thus parasitic: The mutakallimun tended to establish their
own conclusions indirectly, by teasing out inconsistencies
or internal contradictions in the opponent’s position.
This strategy often involved the use of dilemmas, where
the adversary would find himself trapped between two
unacceptable consequences that could be avoided only by
adopting the questioner’s position. The mutakallimun
commonly fashioned their arguments with an eye to the
specific concerns, presuppositions, and methods of their
opponents as well, advancing internal critiques of their
adversaries to refute them on their own terms. Ironically,
their assault on the falasifa in the eleventh and twelfth
centuries, which effectively brought an end to the classi-
cal period of Islamic philosophy, required the instru-
mental adoption of Aristotelian logic, specifically, the
demonstrative syllogism.
Although the presence of dialectical methods within
the Islamic and Jewish traditions is often attributed
directly to Greek influences, a number of contemporary
scholars and historical figures have made the case that
versions of these argumentative strategies in fact predate
exposure to Christian, Greek, or Syriac sources.
See also Aristotle; Dialectic; Islamic Philosophy; Jewish
Philosophy.
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